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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In Warren v. Dinter,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a 
physician who consulted with a nurse practitioner2 regarding the nurse 
practitioner’s patient had a duty to the patient. The court reasoned that this 
duty existed because it was foreseeable that the patient would rely on 
information provided to the nurse practitioner by the physician.3 This 
decision was based on one hundred years of medical malpractice precedent 
in Minnesota, where courts have consistently held that even if no 
                                                           
*J.D. candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, May 2022. I would like to thank Professor 
Mike Steenson for serving as my faculty advisor and providing valuable guidance and 
expertise throughout the writing and editing process. 
1 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2019). 
2 MINN. STAT. § 148.171, subdiv. 3 (2019). Nurse practitioners (sometimes abbreviated as 
“NP”) are also referred to as “advanced practice registered nurses.” Id.  
Nurse practitioner practice includes: (1) health promotion, disease prevention, 
health education, and counseling; (2) providing health assessment and screening 
activities; (3) diagnosing, treating, and facilitating patients’ management of their 
acute and chronic illnesses and diseases; (4) ordering, performing, supervising, 
and interpreting diagnostic studies . . . (5) prescribing pharmacologic and 
nonpharmacologic therapies; and (6) consulting with, collaborating with, or 
referring to other health care providers as warranted by the needs of the patient.  
Id. § 148.171, subdiv. 11. 
3 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 377. 
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physician-patient relationship4 exists, a physician may still have a duty to a 
party if it is foreseeable that the party would rely on the physician’s advice 
and be harmed.5 This case note argues that while Warren used a standard 
consistent with a century’s worth of jurisprudence in Minnesota, the court’s 
application of the standard in Warren was overbroad. Accordingly, Warren 
will have significant, lasting, and detrimental implications for medical 
professionals and others.  
 This case note begins with a historical overview of the law relevant to 
medical malpractice claims in Minnesota and other states. The history 
section also includes a brief chronicle of nurse practitioner practice 
authority in Minnesota and an overview of the legal evolution of both nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants.6 Section III provides a summary of 
the facts and procedural history of Warren. Finally, Section IV offers an 
analysis of several issues created by Warren, including how the decision may 
affect certain communications between physicians and their colleagues, 
whether the foreseeability of harm standard should be narrowly construed, 
and what the medical malpractice implications of Warren may be for 
physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. The analysis 
explains how Warren could lead to unintended consequences and 
confusion among health care providers and other professionals and 
provides guidance for mitigating these issues. The section concludes with 
potential solutions for health care practitioners and other professionals who 
are wary of Warren’s holding.  
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW 
 This history section begins with the elements of general negligence, 
professional negligence, and medical malpractice claims in Minnesota. 
Next, it discusses the history of the use of the foreseeability of harm standard 
                                                           
4 The term “physician-patient relationship” is used throughout this article. However, the term 
may also be used to describe the relationship between patients and health care professionals 
who are not physicians, including nurse practitioners (and other nurses), physician assistants, 
and other professionals who provide health care services to patients. Likewise, the term 
“physician” may be used in this article in the interest of brevity, although, contextually, the 
term may imply both physicians and non-physicians, advanced practice providers (like nurse 
practitioners), and physician assistants. 
5 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 377.  
6 Physician assistants (sometimes abbreviated as “PAs”) are discussed in this case note 
because they have historically had relationships with physicians—similar to those of nurse 
practitioners and physicians—and they often provide the same health care services to patients. 
Nurse practitioners and physician assistants are often treated similarly to one another under 
state and federal laws, and many of the legal ramifications for nurse practitioners in cases like 
Warren will likely impact physician assistants as well. See discussion infra Section II.E. 
3
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in medical malpractice and other professional liability cases in the state. This 
is followed by an analysis of other states’ approaches to medical malpractice, 
which typically require a physician-patient relationship between the plaintiff 
and the defendant. A brief history of nurse practitioner practice authority in 
Minnesota, both pre- and post-Warren follows. Finally, this section 
describes the legal evolution of advanced practice providers like nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants. 
A. The General Standards for Negligence in Minnesota 
 In Minnesota, four elements must be met for a showing of general 
negligence: (1) the existence of a duty of care by the defendant; (2) 
defendant’s breach of that duty; (3) a resulting injury to the plaintiff; and (4) 
that defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.7 
Slightly different elements may be required in cases related to professional 
negligence. For example, in a case related to legal malpractice, a plaintiff 
must show: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) either 
negligent action or breach of contract by the attorney; (3) the attorney’s 
negligent action or breach of contract was the proximate cause of damages 
incurred by the plaintiff; and (4) but for the attorney’s actions, the plaintiff 
would have been successful in his or her claim.8  
 A medical malpractice claim in Minnesota has the same elements as 
a general negligence claim.9 While a showing of legal malpractice in 
Minnesota requires some kind of relationship to exist between the plaintiff 
and the attorney, a showing of medical malpractice does not require the 
existence of a physician-patient relationship.10 Instead, the plaintiff must 
show the existence of a duty running from the health care provider to the 
plaintiff.11 This duty arises when it is reasonably foreseeable that an injury 
could occur if medical advice is negligently given.12  
                                                           
7 Funchess v. Cecil Norman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn. 2001). 
8 Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn. 1980) (citing Christy 
v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293–94 (1970)). 
9 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 375 (citing Molloy v. Meier (Molloy II), 679 N.W.2d 711, 717 
(Minn. 2004)). 
10 Id.  
11 Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d at 717 (citing Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1, 
8 (Minn. 1982)). Warren refers to this case as “Molloy II” to differentiate it from the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in Molloy v. Meier (Molloy I), 660 N.W.2d 444 
(Minn. App. 2003), also cited in Warren. See Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 375. 
12 Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d at 719 (citing Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 325, 173 N.W. 
663, 663–64 (1919); Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 686). Relying on Skillings, the Warren court 
expanded on Minnesota’s use of foreseeability instead of requiring a physician-patient 
relationship and stated that everyone, including professionals like physicians, is “‘responsible 
4
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B. The History of the “Foreseeability of Harm” Standard and Professional 
Liability in Minnesota  
 Minnesota courts have a long tradition of using a “foreseeability of 
harm” standard to determine whether a physician has a legal duty of care to 
a party in the absence of an established physician-patient relationship.13 The 
use of this standard sets Minnesota apart from the majority of other U.S. 
jurisdictions, which base a physician’s duty to a party on the existence of 
such a relationship.14 Minnesota’s jurisprudence in this area may be traced 
back to the decision in Skillings v. Allen, where the court held that a 
physician treating a child who was hospitalized with scarlet fever owed a duty 
to the child’s parents when he advised them it was safe to visit their daughter, 
even though she remained contagious.15 The court reasoned the physician 
should have foreseen that the parents would rely on the physician’s 
assurance, and as such, he had a duty to act with due care to protect the 
parents’ health.16 
 Today, Minnesota courts continue to focus on foreseeability of harm 
in medical malpractice cases that involve injury to a party who does not have 
a physician-patient relationship with the defendant.17 For instance, in Molloy 
v. Meier (Molloy II), the court drew from the holdings in Skillings and other 
cases and stated, “A duty arises where it is reasonably foreseeable that [a 
party] would be injured” if the defendant were negligent.18 This decision also 
represented the court’s conscious choice to reject any attempts to narrowly 
construe the Skillings foreseeability of harm standard, which would cause 
Skillings to apply only in cases involving some kind of relationship, 
                                                           
for the direct consequences of [their] negligent acts whenever [they are] placed in such a 
position with regard to another that it is obvious that if [they do] not use care in [their] own 
conduct [they] will cause injury to that’ third party.” Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 376 (quoting 
Skillings, 143 Minn. at 325, 173 N.W. at 663–64). 
13 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 379. 
14 See id. at 377. While many states require a physician-patient relationship as “a necessary 
element of malpractice claims,” Minnesota has never held that a physician-patient 
relationship is required for a medical malpractice action. Id. at 375. 
15 Skillings, 143 Minn. at 324–25, 173 N.W. at 663. 
16 Id. at 326, 173 N.W. at 664. 
17 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 376. 
18 Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d 711, 719–20 (Minn. 2004). The Molloy II court also drew from 
the holding in Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 381, 95 N.W.2d 657, 664 (1959), 
which quoted the seminal torts case, Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 
(N.Y. 1928) in stating, “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, 
and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.” 
5
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physician-patient or otherwise.19 Specifically, as noted in the Warren 
decision, the court used Molloy II to overturn McElwain v. Van Beek, 
which held the foreseeability of harm standard was only relevant when a 
contractual relationship existed between the physician and the party.20 
 Minnesota’s use of the foreseeability of harm standard in 
professional negligence matters extends beyond medical malpractice.21 For 
instance, Minnesota courts have broadly drawn the attorney-client 
relationship to create a duty that is “derived from the professional 
relationship,” even if no explicit or contractual relationship exists.22 
Specifically, in Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, the court held that 
an attorney who completed a consultation with a potential client had a duty 
to act with due care in offering legal advice because, even though no 
attorney-client relationship had been established, it was foreseeable that the 
potential client would rely on the attorney’s advice and be harmed if the 
advice was negligently provided.23 Since the 1919 Skillings decision, 
Minnesota courts, on multiple occasions, have approved of the utility of the 
foreseeability of harm standard in various legal questions regarding a 
professional’s duty to a third party.24 It should be little surprise, then, that 
this once again occurred in Warren.25 
C. Other States’ Use of the Physician-Patient Relationship 
 While Minnesota does not require the existence of a physician-
patient relationship to establish a health care professional’s duty to a party, 
many other states do require such a relationship.26 However, there are 
                                                           
19 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 377. 
20 McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). As noted by the 
court in Warren, the Skillings court held that, even if there were no contractual relationship 
between the physician and the patient’s parents, the result would be the same because the 
potential harm was foreseeable to the physician. Skillings, 143 Minn. at 327, 173 N.W. at 
663. It was this foreseeability that created the duty, not the presence of a contractual 
obligation to the parents. Id. 
21 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 376. 
22 Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980). 
23 Id. at 689–90. 
24 See, e.g., id. at 686 (a lawyer’s duty to a potential client); see also Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d 
711 (Minn. 2004) (a physician’s duty to a child’s parent). 
25 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 377. 
26 See, e.g., Estate of Kundert ex rel. Kundert v. Ill. Valley Cmty. Hosp., 964 N.E.2d 670, 
672 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“In the medical malpractice arena, a ‘physician’s duty arises only 
when a clear and direct physician-patient relationship has been established.’” (quoting Siwa 
v. Koch, 902 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (Ill. App. 2009))); Roberts v. Sankey, 813 N.E.2d 1195, 
1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The duty owed by a physician arises from the physician-patient 
relationship.” (citation omitted)); Olson v. Wrenshall, 822 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Neb. 2012) 
6
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varying approaches for determining when a physician-patient relationship 
exists. For instance, many states require a physician-patient relationship to 
be consensual on each side, whereby the patient seeks out the physician’s 
care and the physician agrees to treat the patient.27 Several courts have held 
that such consent by a physician to treat a patient must be express, meaning 
that the physician must take some affirmative action or otherwise knowingly 
treat the patient.28 A few courts have held that a physician-patient 
relationship requires a contractual agreement either with the patient29 or with 
the physician’s employer.30 
 The situation is less clear when it comes to a physician’s duty to a 
third party or a party who is not explicitly the physician’s patient. Several 
courts have held that if a physician provides a consulting opinion about a 
patient’s care by reviewing x-ray films, lab results, or patient records, an 
implied physician-patient relationship is created.31 This can be true even if 
                                                           
(“A physician’s duty to exercise the applicable standard of care arises out of the physician-
patient relationship.”); Thomas v. Hermoso, 973 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) 
(“Liability for medical malpractice may not be imposed in the absence of a physician-patient 
relationship.”); Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 909 (Or. 2012) (“In Oregon, as 
in most states, a physician-patient relationship is a necessary predicate to stating a medical 
malpractice claim.”); Fay v. Grand Strand Reg’l Med. Ctr., 771 S.E.2d 639, 644 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2015) (“The establishment of a doctor/patient relationship is a prerequisite to a claim 
of medical malpractice.”). 
27 Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001) (citing Lopez v. Aziz, 
852 S.W.2d 303, 306–07 (Tex. App. 1993)). 
28 Id.; see also Huddle v. Heindel, 821 S.E.2d 61, 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (stating that a 
physician-patient relationship is consensual when the patient “knowingly seeks the assistance 
of the physician and the physician knowingly accepts [her] as a patient”); Kundert, 964 
N.E.2d at 675 (explaining that the physician-patient relationship “cannot be established 
where a patient does not seek that physician’s medical advice and the physician does not 
knowingly accept that person as a patient” (citation omitted)); Thayer, 792 N.E.2d at 925 
(providing the three factors that Indiana courts consider to determine whether a consensual 
physician-patient relationship exists: (1) whether the physician made a recommendation to 
the patient regarding a condition or treatment; (2) whether the physician provided or 
participated in the patient’s treatment; and (3) whether the physician acted in such a way that 
the patient could infer that a physician-patient relationship had been established). 
29 See Gallardo v. United States, 752 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir. 2014) (applying Colorado law 
in stating a physician’s duty comes from an “express or implied contractual relationship”). 
30 See Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a contractual 
relationship between a physician and the physician’s employer could have created a duty in 
the physician if the patient had proven that he was the intended beneficiary of the contract). 
31 See, e.g., Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 448 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) 
(holding that a physician-patient relationship was implied between a patient and a consulting, 
on-call physician when the physician viewed the patient’s lab results and x-ray films because 
the physician (1) participated in the patient’s diagnosis; (2) participated in the patient’s 
treatment or prescribed a course of treatment for the patient; and (3) owed a duty to the 
7
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the consulting physician never examined, met, or even knew the name of 
the patient.32 
 Still, the premise that a physician-patient relationship may exist by 
implication is not absolute. There are several instances where courts have 
held that certain activities are not enough to constitute an implied physician-
patient relationship—in which case, no duty exists.33 Such cases often involve 
either brief consultations or informal conversations between physicians 
rather than formal requests for specific medical advice. These informal 
discussions are often referred to as “curbside consultations.”34  
                                                           
facility, staff, or patient for whom the physician served in an on-call capacity); Thomas, 973 
N.Y.S.2d at 346 (finding that a physician-patient relationship is implied “when a physician 
gives advice to a patient, even if the advice is communicated through another health care 
professional”); Kelley v. Middle Tenn. Emergency Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 593 
(Tenn. 2004) (explaining that a physician-patient relationship “may arise out of a consultation 
by the patient’s primary physician with another physician when that consultation is for the 
treatment of that patient,” with consultation including activities like reviewing patient records 
and discussing diagnosis and treatment (citation omitted)). 
32 See, e.g., Mackey v. Sarroca, 35 N.E.3d 631, 637–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (stating that a 
physician may have a duty to a patient when there is a “special relationship,” including 
instances when the physician is asked by a colleague to take some action on the patient’s 
behalf, such as conducting tests or reviewing or interpreting test results, even when the 
consulting physician has never seen the patient, so long as the consulting physician has taken 
“some affirmative action to participate in the care, evaluation, diagnosis, or treatment of a 
specific patient”); Gillespie v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 900 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) 
(providing that a consensual physician-patient relationship may exist when the physician is 
contacted by someone acting on the patient’s behalf or when the physician performs services 
for the patient—even when the physician did not meet or interact with the patient); Wheeler 
v. Yettie Kersting Mem’l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 39–40 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that an 
on-call physician who reviewed a patient’s status with a nurse over the phone and provided 
a medical decision sought by the nurse established an implied physician-patient relationship 
even though the physician did not actually examine the patient). 
33 See, e.g., Pham v. Black, 820 S.E.2d 209, 212 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that a hospitalist 
physician who refused to admit a patient after consulting with the patient’s treating physicians 
did not have a physician-patient relationship with—or a duty to—the patient because the 
physician did not meet the patient or participate in the patient’s diagnosis or treatment); 
Harper v. Hippensteel, 994 N.E.2d 1233, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a physician 
who was in a collaborative practice agreement with a nurse practitioner such that he reviewed 
five percent of her patient records did not have a physician-patient relationship with the nurse 
practitioner’s patient even though he was required by law to be available to the nurse 
practitioner for consultative purposes); Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001) (“A 
physician who gives an ‘informal opinion,’ . . . at the request of a treating physician, does not 
owe a duty to the patient because no physician-patient relationship is created.”). 
34 Although the decision does not define the term, Irvin is one of a handful of cases that 
specifically uses the term “curbside consultation.” Irvin, 31 P.3d at 943. The Irvin court 
acknowledged that curbside consultations are “medically important but legally ambiguous” 
and noted that courts have been reluctant to extend the traditional physician-patient 
8
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 Finally, it is important to note—particularly in light of the fact pattern 
and questions raised in Warren—that some courts have acknowledged an 
increased emphasis on team-based health care, in which multiple physicians 
work together to diagnose and treat a patient.35 In these cases, courts have 
held that a physician-patient relationship may be implied between a 
physician and a party, who is not explicitly the physician’s patient, based on 
an analysis of multiple factors, including whether the physician in question 
took some affirmative action to knowingly participate in the patient’s 
diagnosis or treatment.36 
 Some legal commentators have suggested that since, in most states, 
a physician-patient relationship forms the foundation of a medical 
malpractice claim, the manner in which this relationship is established 
should be more uniformly defined to better prevent the filing of frivolous 
lawsuits.37 There is currently a lack of consistency in establishing when a 
                                                           
relationship to include these “informal consultations.” Id. The court also found that holding 
physicians responsible for information exchanged during curbside consultations would be 
contrary to public policy as it would chill efforts to improve patient care through the exchange 
of medical knowledge. Id. While the case law does not explore curbside consultations at 
length, there are several journal articles that discuss these interactions. These articles (and 
their conclusions) are discussed further infra Part IV. 
35 In Mead v. Legacy Health System, the court stated that in today’s health care system, where 
physicians work together to provide care to individual patients,  
whether a physician’s expression of an opinion constitutes a diagnosis [and has therefore 
established a physician-patient relationship with the patient by implication] will vary 
depending on, among other things, the customary practice within the relevant medical 
community, the degree and the level of formality with which one physician has assumed (or 
the other physician has ceded) responsibility for the diagnosis or treatment, the relative 
expertise of the two physicians, and the reasonable expectations, if any, of the patient under 
the circumstances.  
In our view, the standard should not be whether a judge or a jury would classify a statement 
as a diagnosis or the provision of treatment. Rather, it should be whether a physician who 
has not personally seen a patient either knows or reasonably should know that he or she is 
diagnosing a patient’s condition or treating the patient. 
283 P.3d 904, 910 (Or. 2012). 
Likewise, in Kelley, 133 S.W.3d at 596, the court stated that today’s health care system is 
increasingly complex, with several physicians participating in patient diagnosis when they may 
not have ever interacted with the patient. As such, it is “simply unrealistic to apply a narrow 
definition of the physician-patient relationship in determining whether such a relationship 
exists for purposes of a medical malpractice case.” Id. However, unlike the result in Mead, 
in Kelley, the court held that a physician-patient relationship could exist between the 
consulting physician and the patient. See id. at 598.  
36 Mead, 283 P.3d at 910; see also Kelley, 133 S.W.3d at 596. 
37 See Meghan C. O’Connor, The Physician-Patient Relationship and the Professional 
Standard of Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principles to Achieve the Goals of Tort 
Reform, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L..J. 109, 132 (2010) (stating that a clearer definition 
9
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physician-patient relationship is formed and what factors are relevant for 
determining whether such a relationship exists.38 This inconsistency may 
cause medical malpractice claims to be adjudicated based on vague 
standards, allowing plaintiffs in states that require a physician-patient 
relationship for such claims to essentially bypass this requirement 
altogether.39 
 However, the case law reviewed in this section shows that it is difficult 
to establish precisely when a physician-patient relationship is formed. While 
courts appear eager to create a definition for this relationship, no single test 
has emerged as the clear favorite. In light of this uncertainty, compelling 
arguments have been made for finding a middle ground.40 In other words, 
according to this viewpoint, courts should neither allow a brief phone call 
between physicians to create a physician-patient relationship, nor require a 
comprehensive physical exam before such a relationship is established.41  
 Other commentators have gone further, arguing that a physician-
patient relationship should not be required for a finding of medical 
negligence.42 This argument centers on the idea that, in the modern health 
care system, more patients may actually be “nonpatients” who may not be 
able to show a physician-patient relationship but have had some interaction 
with a physician that has allegedly led to harm.43 While these “nonpatients” 
could arguably still sue a physician for ordinary negligence, the applicable 
standard of care (that of a reasonable person versus that of a reasonable 
physician in a particular field of medicine) may be less favorable.44 Under 
this argument, removing the requirement of a traditional physician-patient 
relationship could allow for relief where it otherwise may be lacking.45 This 
view, which allows for the use of a foreseeability of harm standard, rather 
                                                           
of the elements of a medical malpractice claim, including the physician-patient relationship, 
could reduce the costs associated with such claims and decrease “meritless lawsuits”). 
38 Id.; see also Valarie Blake, When Is a Patient-Physician Relationship Established?, 14 AM. 
MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 403, 404–05 (2012) (illustrating that the determination of a 
physician-patient relationship often depends on the situation and state law). 
39 O’Connor, supra note 37, at 111. 
40 Teresa Baird, Note, Who Is Actually Calling the Shots? Watch Out, They May Not Be 
Liable: Irvin v. Smith, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 185, 204 (2003). 
41 Id. 
42 See Patrick D. Blake, Note, Redefining Physicians’ Duties: An Argument for Eliminating 
the Physician-Patient Relationship Requirement in Actions for Medical Malpractice, 40 GA. 
L. REV. 573, 612 (2006) (noting that a balancing test based on multiple factors may be more 
appropriate than a strict, direct-contact test for determining whether a physician-patient 
relationship exists). 
43 Id. at 575. 
44 Id. at 576–77. 
45 Id. 
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than a required physician-patient relationship,46 is similar to that used by 
Minnesota courts. 
D. Nurse Practitioner Practice Authority in Minnesota, Pre- and Post-
Warren 
 The events leading to the Warren decision took place at an 
interesting time for Minnesota nurse practitioners. In 2014, when Simon 
first examined Warren, Simon, like all nurse practitioners in Minnesota, 
was required to designate a collaborating physician.47 Collaborating 
physicians and nurse practitioners were expected to enter into “collaborative 
management plans,” which set forth the process by which the nurse 
practitioner would consult with the physician while still retaining primary 
responsibility for the patient’s care.48 Nurse practitioners were also required 
to enter into a written agreement with a physician as a condition of obtaining 
the authority to prescribe medications and medical devices.49  
 However, in 2015, Minnesota enacted new legislation that removed 
both the collaborative plan and prescriptive authority agreement 
requirements from the law.50 This, combined with provisions in the new law 
establishing a licensure process for nurse practitioners, resulted in nurse 
practitioners gaining full and independent practice authority in the state.51 
E. The Legal Evolution of Advanced Practice Providers 
Warren addressed an issue of growing importance in today’s 
discussions about health care delivery: the expanding practice authority of 
advanced practice providers like nurse practitioners and physician assistants 
in many states. Minnesota licenses both nurse practitioners52 and physician 
assistants53 to provide health care services to patients. Nurse practitioners 
are nurses who have completed a master’s or doctorate-level education.54 In 
                                                           
46 Id. at 599. 
47 MINN. STAT. § 148.171, subdiv. 6 (2014).  
48 Id. subdivs. 6–7. 
49 MINN. STAT. § 148.235, subdiv. 2 (2014). 
50 APRN Scope of Practice Bill Signed and Effective January 1, 2015, MINN. BD. OF NURSING 
(May 29, 2014), https://mn.gov/boards/nursing/resources/news/?id=21-37188 
[https://perma.cc/4PTH-YDUD]. 
51 Id. 
52 MINN. STAT. § 148.211, subdiv. 1(a) (2019). 
53 MINN. STAT. § 147A.02 (2019). 
54 What’s a Nurse Practitioner (NP)?, AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, https://www.
aanp.org/about/all-about-nps/whats-a-nurse-practitioner [https://perma.cc/Q3DS-2UTV] 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
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addition to obtaining state licensure, nurse practitioners are nationally 
certified in clinical focus areas that include, among other areas, family 
medicine, adult primary care, acute care, pediatrics, psychiatry, and 
women’s health.55 Nurse practitioners commonly practice in hospitals, 
clinics, emergency rooms, urgent cares, nursing homes, and other settings.56 
In Minnesota, a nurse practitioner’s scope of practice includes educating 
and counseling patients on health care and disease prevention, health 
screening, and assessment; diagnosing and treating patient illnesses; 
ordering, performing, and interpreting diagnostic tests; and prescribing 
medications and medical devices.57 As of March 2020, there are more than 
290,000 nurse practitioners licensed in the United States58 and more than 
9000 licensed in Minnesota.59 
On the other hand, physician assistants are medical providers who 
have completed a master’s degree.60 A handful of doctorate-level 
educational programs are also available for physician assistants.61 Unlike 
nurse practitioners, who have a clear path to entering the profession as a 
registered nurse, physician assistants often come from varied backgrounds 
within other areas of health care, bringing professional experience as 
medical assistants, paramedics, athletic trainers, or other patient-facing 
providers.62 Physician assistants practice in hospitals, medical offices, 
community health centers, retail clinics, nursing homes, correctional 
institutions, and other settings.63 Physician assistants in Minnesota take 
patient histories; perform physical examinations; order and perform 
                                                           
55 AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, NP FACTS (2020), https://storage.aanp.org/www/
documents/NPFacts__021920.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYD2-HZPY]. 
56 AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, supra note 54. 
57 MINN. STAT. § 148.171, subdiv. 11 (2019).  
58 AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, supra note 55. 
59 MINN. BD. OF NURSING, ANNUAL LICENSURE REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 8 (2019), 
https://mn.gov/boards/assets/Annual_Licnsr_Rprt_2019_tcm21-322613.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4JQ-CE8T].  
60 AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, WHAT IS A PA? (2019), https://www.aapa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/What_Is_A_PA_Infographic_LetterSize_Jan2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z96C-9DJY].  
61 See, e.g., Doctor of Medical Science, A.T. STILL UNIV., https://www.atsu.edu/doctor-of-
medical-science [https://perma.cc/3RN6-88A4] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019); Doctor of 
Medical Science, UNIV. OF LYNCHBURG, https://www.lynchburg.edu/academics/college-of-
health-sciences/physician-assistant-medicine/doctor-of-medical-science/ 
[https://perma.cc/KYG3-VKAX] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019); Doctor of Medical Science, 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN UNIV. OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, https://rm.edu/academics/doctor-of-
medical-science/ [https://perma.cc/NXW9-DD46] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
62 AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, supra note 60. 
63 Id. 
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diagnostic and therapeutic procedures; counsel patients on disease 
management and prevention; transmit and execute specific patient orders; 
prescribe, administer, and dispense medications; and assist in surgery.64 As 
of March 2020, there are more than 140,000 physician assistants licensed 
in the United States65 and more than 3300 licensed in Minnesota.66 
Nurse practitioners and physician assistants are widely seen as 
occupying an important space in health care delivery.67 This recognition is 
increasingly leading to the inclusion of nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants in federal and state legislation meant to increase access to health 
care services.68 For instance, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(Affordable Care Act) defined “primary care practitioners” as physicians, 
nurse practitioners, and physician assistants.69 Recent federal legislation has 
also authorized nurse practitioners and physician assistants to provide 
federally regulated, medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder70 
and supervise cardiac and pulmonary rehabilitation programs for Medicare 
patients.71 
Similarly, state legislatures are increasingly enacting laws to expand the 
roles of these providers. As of 2019, twenty-two states (including Minnesota) 
and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation authorizing full 
                                                           
64 MINN. STAT. § 147A.09, subdiv. 2 (2019). 
65 AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, supra note 60.  
66 Licensure Statistics, MINN. BD. OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, https://mn.gov/boards/medical-
practice/consumers/data/stats/ [https://perma.cc/4QT3-RUKS] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
67 See Jacquelyn Corley, Advanced-Practice Providers Are Key to America’s Healthcare 
Future, FORBES: CAPITAL FLOWS (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/03/16/advanced-practice-providers-are-key-to-
americas-healthcare-future/#720911975998 [https://perma.cc/XCF5-JM4P] (explaining that 
advanced practice providers “represent a healthcare workforce of certified and state-licensed 
medical professionals that are essential to operations in both inpatient and outpatient 
settings”). 
68 See Christopher Cheney, More States Pushing for Autonomy in Scope-of-Practice Battle, 
HEALTH LEADERS (May 1, 2019), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/clinical-care/more-
states-pushing-autonomy-scope-practice-battle [https://perma.cc/TR8Y-W55G] 
(“[A]dvanced practice practitioners have been equally insistent on gaining expanded scope 
of practice across the country. For example, in several states, laws that expand scope of 
practice for physician assistants (PA), nurse practitioners (NP), and advanced practice 
registered nurses (APRN) have already been adopted.”). 
69 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009 § 5501, 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(x)(2)(A) 
(2018). 
70 Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 § 303, 21 U.S.C. § 
823(g)(2)(G)(iii)(II) (2018). 
71 Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 § 51008, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(eee) (2018). This provision is 
not effective until January 1, 2024. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 
§ 51008(c). 
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practice authority for nurse practitioners.72 This generally means that nurse 
practitioners in these jurisdictions are able to diagnose, treat, and manage 
patients’ health conditions and prescribe medications without being 
required to enter into a career-long supervisory or collaborative agreement 
with another health care provider such as a physician.73  
Likewise, states are enacting legislation to reduce regulatory burdens 
on physician assistant practice, including removing restrictions on 
prescribing medications, allowing practice-level decision-making about 
physician assistants’ scope of practice, and removing the statutory 
requirement that a physician assistant have a specific relationship with a 
physician or other health care professional.74 In Minnesota, physician 
assistants have full prescriptive authority (including Schedule II-V 
controlled medications),75 and many decisions regarding a physician 
assistant’s role are made at the practice site.76 While physician assistants 
must have a written practice agreement with a supervising physician, the 
physician need not be physically present while the physician assistant is 
providing care. In early 2019, legislation to remove additional barriers to 
physician assistant practice was introduced in the Minnesota Senate.77 
The move towards increased practice authority for advanced practice 
providers is partially due to current and projected physician shortages. For 
instance, Minnesota is expected to need more than 1100 additional primary 
care physicians by 2030.78 This is an increase of nearly 30% over the 2010 
workforce.79 Nationwide, it is expected that there will be a shortage of 
                                                           
72 State Practice Environment, AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.aanp.org/advocacy/state/state-practice-environment [https://perma.cc/V7KU-
3BG2]. 
73 Id. Some states authorizing full practice authority require nurse practitioners to enter into 
a supervisory or collaborative agreement with another health care provider until the nurse 
practitioner has attained a certain amount of practice experience. Id. Minnesota requires 
nurse practitioners to complete 2080 hours in a collaborative agreement with either a 
physician or an experienced nurse practitioner prior to advanced practice licensure. MINN. 
STAT. § 148.211, subdiv. 1c (2019). 
74 See The Six Key Elements of a Modern PA Practice Act, AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN 
ASSISTANTS (Aug. 2018) (unpublished issue brief) (on file with author); Optimal Team 
Practice, AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, https://www.aapa.org/advocacy-
central/optimal-team-practice/ [https://perma.cc/UP4A-2LW9] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
75 MINN. STAT. § 147A.09, subdiv. 2(10) (2019). 
76 Id. subdiv. 1. 
77 S.F. 2043, 91st Sen. Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019).  
78 ROBERT GRAHAM CTR., MINNESOTA: PROJECTING PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN 
WORKFORCE 1 (2013), https://www.graham-center.org/content/dam/rgc/documents/maps-
data-tools/state-collections/workforce-projections/Minnesota.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV29-
HGJL]. 
79 Id. at 2. 
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between 21,000 and 55,000 primary care physicians by 2032.80 Meanwhile, 
the number of nurse practitioners and physician assistants are expected to 
nearly double by 2032.81 As a result, advanced practice providers are 
expected to help mitigate the physician shortage. 
III. THE WARREN DECISION 
A. Factual Background 
Susan Warren went to an Essentia Health clinic with a variety of 
symptoms, including fever, chills, and abdominal pain.82 Sherry Simon, a 
nurse practitioner, examined Warren.83 Simon ordered a blood test for 
Warren and, upon examining the results, found an elevated white blood cell 
count and other atypical markers, which Simon believed were indicative of 
an infection requiring hospitalization.84 
 Simon wrote a letter for Warren’s employer, documenting Warren’s 
illness and stating that Warren would be unable to work.85 Since the Essentia 
health care system did not have a local hospital, Simon contacted the 
Fairview Range Medical Center to request Warren’s admission.86 This 
action was consistent with standard practice at Essentia.87 Simon was 
                                                           
80 ASSOC. OF AM. MED. COLL., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: 
PROJECTIONS FROM 2017 TO 2032, at viii (2019), https://www.aamc.org/system/files/c/2/31-
2019_update_-_the_complexities_of_physician_supply_and_demand_-
_projections_from_2017-2032.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BBV-CW3C]. 
81 Id. at 23. 
82 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 377 (Minn. 2019). 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 372. The Warren majority used this letter to show that Simon had already reached a 
conclusion regarding whether Warren should be hospitalized. Id. at 379. Therefore, 
according to the majority, Simon’s conversation with Dinter was not a curbside consultation 
in which Simon sought to “pick a colleague’s brain about a diagnosis.” Id. Rather, Simon 
called Dinter solely as part of the protocol for requesting patient admission at Simon’s facility. 
Id. 
86 Id. at 372. 
87 Id. at 372–73. 
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connected with one of the three hospitalists,88 Dr. Richard Dinter, at 
Fairview.89  
Simon and Dinter spoke for approximately ten minutes.90 At trial, they 
disagreed on the specifics of the diagnostic information shared by Simon 
during this call.91 They also disagreed about whether Simon requested 
Warren to be hospitalized or whether Simon asked Dinter’s opinion 
regarding potential hospitalization.92 However, both agreed that Dinter told 
Simon that Warren’s elevated white blood cell count was likely due to 
uncontrolled diabetes.93 They both also agreed that Dinter advised Simon 
to “get that issue under control and see Warren the following Monday.”94 
However, Simon claimed Dinter told her Warren did not need to be 
hospitalized, while Dinter claimed he responded to Simon’s question with, 
“to what end[?]”95  
 After her call with Dinter, Simon spoke with her collaborating 
physician,96 Dr. Jan Baldwin, in hopes that Baldwin would be able to assist 
Simon with her request to hospitalize Warren.97 Like Dinter, Baldwin 
advised Simon that diabetes could be the cause of Warren’s abnormal 
blood test results.98 Simon informed Warren that she had been advised by 
a hospitalist (Dinter) that Warren did not require immediate 
hospitalization.99 Simon discussed the diabetes diagnosis with Warren, 
                                                           
88 Hospitalists, AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, https://www.aafp.org/practice-
management/administration/hospitalists.html [https://perma.cc/9NNY-KGVN] (last visited 
Sep. 5, 2019). Hospitalists are physicians who primarily provide patient care in a hospital 
setting. Id. They often assess a patient’s condition prior to or at the time of admission to a 
hospital. Id. A hospital or health care system may employ a hospitalist for the primary 
purpose of admitting patients. See Hospital Medicine, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, 
https://www.acponline.org/about-acp/about-internal-medicine/general-internal-
medicine/hospital-medicine [https://perma.cc/4T7H-MZH2] (last visited Sep. 5, 2019). 
89 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 372. 






96 See MINN. STAT. § 148.171, subdiv. 6 (2014). At the time of Warren’s initial visit to Simon, 
Simon was subject to Minnesota laws requiring nurse practitioners to have ongoing 
“collaborative management” by a physician. Id. This arrangement required nurse 
practitioners to establish a relationship with a physician practicing in a similar area of health 
care such that the nurse practitioner could consult with the physician as necessary to advance 
patient care. Id. subdivs. 6–7. 
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prescribed medication, scheduled a follow-up appointment, and released 
Warren to her home.100 Warren was found dead three days later due to 
sepsis caused by an untreated staph infection.101 
B. Lower Courts’ Decisions 
 Warren’s son sued Dinter, claiming Dinter was negligent in telling 
Simon that he did not believe Warren needed to be hospitalized.102 Dinter 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that he did not have a duty 
to Warren, as Simon had only contacted Dinter due to his role as a 
hospitalist, and, therefore, his advice to Simon was a one-time, “professional 
courtesy.”103 Dinter also argued that his actions (or omissions) were not a 
proximate cause of Warren’s death.104 
 The trial court granted Dinter’s motion for summary judgment on 
the duty issue, holding that the phone call between Simon and Dinter was 
“an informal conversation between medical colleagues,” which did not 
create a physician-patient relationship between Dinter and Warren.105 The 
trial court denied summary judgment on the causation issue, stating that 
there was still a remaining question of fact regarding Warren’s cause of 
death.106 
                                                           
100 Id. 
101 Id. Justice Anderson expanded on Warren’s recent health history in his dissenting opinion. 
When Warren presented to Simon, complaining of “three days of worsening of symptoms 
with fevers, chills, abdominal pain, cough, and shortness of breath,” Warren had also 
explained to Simon that she had experienced approximately three weeks’ worth of exposure 
to welding smoke at her job. Id. at 380–81 (Anderson, J., dissenting). However, Simon told 
Dinter that her examination of Warren was “essentially normal” and that Warren did not 
have a fever and appeared to be “in no apparent distress.” Id. at 381. Simon had also called 
Warren’s employer and poison control and came to the belief (which she expressed to 
Dinter) that the welding smoke was “no longer part of the issue.” Id. Simon preliminarily 
believed that Warren had an infection, due largely to her high white blood-cell count. Id. 
However, Simon also found that Warren’s blood sugar was high, and her sodium was low. 
Id. Simon told Dinter that Warren’s case was “confusing” because her chief complaint was 
smoke inhalation, yet she had myriad other symptoms, including some that Simon did not 
mention to Dinter, such as abdominal distention. Id. Although Simon relayed substantial 
patient information to Dinter, she did not share with him any of Warren’s medical records 
or test results. Id. According to Simon, her conversation with Dinter lasted less than ten 
minutes. Id.  
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 Warren’s son appealed, arguing that, in Minnesota, a duty may exist 
even in the absence of a physician-patient relationship under the 
foreseeability of harm standard.107 Still, the court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s decision, holding that Dinter did not consent to either treating 
Warren or being held responsible for her care.108 The court also noted that 
this case was distinct from both Skillings v. Allen and Molloy v. Meier 
(Molloy II),109 in which the foreseeability of harm standard was used to 
extend a duty to a third party from an existing physician-patient 
relationship.110 Here, there was no existing relationship connecting Dinter 
and Warren to create such a duty.111 Therefore, according to the court of 
appeals, Dinter had no duty to Warren.112 
C. Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision—Majority Opinion 
 Warren’s son appealed again, and the Minnesota Supreme Court 
reversed the lower courts’ decisions.113 The reason for the reversal was 
twofold. First, the court determined the court of appeals had misconstrued 
the holding in Skillings as requiring a contractual relationship to establish a 
physician’s duty to a third party.114 Second, the court noted that using the 
foreseeability of harm standard to determine a physician’s duty, absent a 
physician-patient relationship, had worked in Minnesota for one hundred 
years, and there appeared to be no reason to depart from this principle.115 
 The court then applied the foreseeability of harm standard to 
determine whether it was foreseeable to Dinter that Warren would rely 
upon and be harmed by his statements to Simon regarding Warren’s 
potential hospitalization.116 The court noted that this danger must be 
“objectively reasonable to expect . . . not simply . . . within the realm of any 
                                                           
107 Warren v. Dinter, No. A17-0555, 2018 WL 414333, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018), 
rev’d and remanded, 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2019). 
108 Id. at *3. 
109 Id. at *4 (distinguishing Molloy v. Meier (Molloy II), 679 N.W.2d 711, 713–14, 717 (Minn. 
2004), and Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 325, 173 N.W. 663, 663–664 (1919)). 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 380 (Minn. 2019). 
114 Id. at 377. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 377–78 (“[W]e must ‘apply the principles of negligence law set forth in Skillings and 
Togstad and conclude that the duty arises where it is reasonably foreseeable’ that Warren 
‘would be injured if the advice is negligently given.’” (quoting Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d at 
720)). 
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conceivable possibility.”117 Using this standard, the court found it reasonable 
to conclude Dinter could have foreseen that Warren would rely upon his 
conversation with Simon.118 The court also held that there was sufficient 
evidence to show Dinter’s conversation with Simon constituted a breach in 
the standard of care of a hospitalist, and, therefore, it was a proximate cause 
of Warren’s death.119 
 The court acknowledged Dinter’s and the dissent’s argument that 
the conversation between Dinter and Simon was simply a curbside 
consultation120 and not a formal medical opinion by Dinter.121 However, the 
court was not persuaded by this argument, pointing to Dinter’s status as a 
hospitalist and Simon’s status as a nurse practitioner122 and noting that Simon 
was asking for Warren’s admission to the hospital—not for advice on 
Warren’s diagnosis.123 As such, the court declined to address the legal status 
of curbside consultations any further.124 
 The court’s 5-2 holding remanded the case to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.125 In doing so, the court 
noted that while the subject matter of the case (the duty of a hospitalist to 
another health care provider’s patient) was a question of first impression, 
the underlying issue—whether summary judgment should have been granted 
                                                           
117 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting Foss v. Kinade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009)). 
118 Id. 
119 See id. (referring to expert testimony that Dinter’s statements to Simon were not consistent 
with the standard of care for a hospitalist and noting that if Warren had been admitted to the 
hospital as requested by Simon, she may have survived the infection). 
120 See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
121 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 378. 
122 Id. at 388 n.3. The court noted that while Simon had the authority under her collaboration 
agreement with Baldwin to provide care to Warren, Simon did not have the ability to admit 
Warren to the hospital. Id. This may be due to limitations on Baldwin’s scope of practice 
under Minnesota law at that time, see discussion infra Section II.D., or it may be due to the 
hospital’s credentialing and privileging process. See MINN. HOSP.ASS’N, MEDICAL STAFF 
CREDENTIALING (2016), https://www.mnhospitals.org/Portals/0/Documents/Trustees/briefs-
resources/credential.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WMF-HUAL] (explaining the processes used 
by health care facilities to assure that medical staff are qualified to provide health care services 
and undertake only those services for which they are qualified). Credentialing and privileging 
often involve the collection of information similar to that required for licensure (e.g., proof 
of identity, proof of education, and a background check). This process is completed by each 
facility prior to a practitioner being cleared to provided services therein. Id. Regardless, 
Simon required Dinter’s sign-off to admit Warren to that particular hospital at that time. 
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 388 n.3. 
123 Id. at 379. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 380. 
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on the issue of duty—was not.126 According to the court, when facts related 
to foreseeability (and, therefore, duty) are disputed, or there are differing 
reasonable inferences from facts that are not in dispute (i.e., a “close call”), 
summary judgment should be denied, and the fact finder should determine 
the outcome.127 
D. Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision—Dissenting Opinion 
 In his dissenting opinion, Justice G. Barry Anderson spent significant 
time on the concept of curbside consultations, arguing discussions between 
colleagues are vital to patient care and, therefore, should have been 
addressed by the majority.128 Moreover, Justice Anderson warned that 
allowing one-time conversations between health care professionals to create 
a duty to a patient who is unknown to the consulting professional could have 
a chilling effect on the exchange of ideas related to patient diagnosis and 
treatment.129 As such, he argued the court’s holding could be detrimental to 
both patients and professionals.130 
 The dissent also disagreed with the finding that Dinter should have 
foreseen Warren’s reliance on, and ultimate harm from, his statements to 
Simon.131 Specifically, Justice Anderson argued that Dinter could not have 
foreseen that his statements during a ten-minute phone call would prevent 
Simon (who did have a duty to Warren) from taking further action to verify 
her diagnosis of Warren or from finding alternative means of admitting 
Warren to the hospital.132 As part of this argument, the dissent emphasized 
that Dinter did not make the final determination regarding Warren’s 
treatment or hospitalization.133 For instance, Simon sought a second opinion 
from Baldwin, her collaborating physician.134 Yet, despite other available 
treatment options,135 Simon “yield[ed] control over her patient to the 
hospitalist, . . . defer[ring] to the hospitalist’s views on how to treat the 
                                                           
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 387 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 382. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 383. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. Baldwin testified that while it was unusual for a hospitalist to decline another 
professional’s request to admit a patient, in those situations, the professional may still direct 
the patient to go to the emergency room for observation. Id. The dissent used this testimony 
to illustrate the idea that despite Dinter’s belief that Warren did not require hospitalization, 
Simon could have taken alternative actions to assure Warren received adequate care. Id. 
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patient, [and] conclud[ing] that hospital admission [was] no longer a 
treatment option.”136 This, according to Justice Anderson, was not 
foreseeable behavior.137 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This section begins with an overview of the utility of curbside 
consultations and a discussion of how Warren may put these valuable 
communications at risk. The subsequent analysis advocates for a narrow 
construction of the foreseeability of harm standard in medical malpractice 
cases. This is followed by a discussion of how Warren illustrates the 
implications of the changing relationship between physicians and advanced 
practice providers, particularly on the question of who is liable for patient 
care. The section concludes with some suggestions for health care 
practitioners and other professionals seeking to protect themselves from 
liability in the wake of Warren. 
A. Uncertainty Ahead: Creating a Duty from Curbside Consultations 
This section discusses the concept of curbside consultations, or 
informal consults between physicians and other health care professionals. It 
first examines the utility of these communications and the differences 
between curbside and formal consultations. Second, it discusses the reasons 
health care professionals rely on informal discussions with colleagues when 
treating patients. The section goes on to describe potential consequences of 
the Warren decision when it comes to curbside consultations. Finally, it 
addresses special considerations relevant to hospitalists, and why even when 
a physician takes a gatekeeper role, his interactions with other professionals 
should in some cases be considered informal. 
1. Background on Curbside Consultations  
The Warren court was clear in its holding that it did not believe it was 
necessary to address the legal implications of curbside consultations.138 That 
is because, in the majority’s view, the conversation between Simon and 
Dinter was not an informal discussion.139 Still, the court noted that other 
states have addressed curbside consultations between health care 
professionals140 and acknowledged that creating a duty out of these 
                                                           
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 382. 
138 Id. at 379.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 378 (quoting Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001)). 
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conversations could limit practitioners’ willingness to engage with their 
colleagues.141 Yet, it remains unclear how Minnesota courts will treat 
curbside consultations in the future. 
 Curbside consultations are informal conversations between 
physicians (or physicians and other health care professionals) that include 
an exchange of information regarding patient care.142 These conversations 
are not generally known to the patient, and no payment is made to the 
consulting professional.143 They tend to happen “opportunistically” or in 
passing, rather than via a formal meeting or appointment.144 These 
interactions are distinct from formal consultations, which involve a referral 
and examination of the patient by the consulting professional.145  
While formal consultations can result in a physician-patient 
relationship, informal or curbside consultations do not.146 Curbside 
consultations also do not cause the consulting physician to be responsible 
for the care of the patient in question.147 This is largely because the role of 
the consulting professional is indirect.148 In a typical curbside consultation, a 
conversation regarding the patient’s history, symptoms, or condition may 
occur, but the consulting physician does not generally see the patient’s 
records, view the patient’s test results, or examine the patient.149 
2. The Value of Curbside Consultations to Health Care Practitioners 
                                                           
141 Id. The amici curiae’s brief—jointly submitted by the Minnesota Hospital Association, the 
Minnesota Medical Association, and the American Medical Association—expanded on this 
point. The brief noted that “[w]hen faced with a constellation of symptoms and attempting 
to formulate a diagnosis and treatment plan, physicians should be encouraged to seek out 
colleagues with different experience or backgrounds to assist them in analyzing the medical 
information.” Brief for Minn. Hosp. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 4, Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2019) (No. A17-0555), 2018 WL 4003503, 
at *4 [hereinafter Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief]. The brief further explained that “accepting 
Appellant’s argument—that a provider who offers an informal suggestion or ideas to an 
independent provider about her patient now has a physician-patient relationship with that 
person—would chill those important conversations and be detrimental to patient care in 
Minnesota.” Id. at 6. 
142 Cathy M. Perley, Physician Use of the Curbside Consultation to Address Information 






148 Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 5. 
149 Id. 
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 There are many reasons why a physician or other health care 
professional may choose to engage in curbside consultations instead of 
formally referring a patient to another provider. Researchers who observed 
the informal consulting practices of physicians reported that physicians 
engage in these conversations to:  
confirm a suspected diagnosis or planned course of action (e.g., 
to “bounce ideas off their practice partners”150);  
get quick answers to questions about symptoms or treatment 
options;  
informally learn more about a symptom or condition from a 
practitioner in a particular specialty;  
explore the necessity of referring the patient for a formal 
consultation;  
triage patients in a particular practice setting (e.g., determining 
which patients should see which providers in an emergency 
room);  
seek out emotional support from colleagues during difficult cases 
or in advance of tough conversations with a patient or the patient’s 
family; 
create bonds or relationships with their colleagues;  
seek out like-minded practitioners or colleagues with similar 
treatment styles;  
confirm their own clinical knowledge; and  
investigate the appropriateness of transferring a patient to another 
practitioner.151  
 These observations largely track physicians’ stated reasons for 
engaging in curbside consultations.152 Physicians view curbside consultations 
as a means of providing better patient care and fulfilling what they see as 
professional obligations to their colleagues.153 However, some physicians 
may feel pressure to engage in curbside consultations because they are so 
prevalent in the profession.154 This leads to an occasional characterization of 
curbside consultations as a “necessary evil”—a useful tool for the most part, 
but one which may come with risks.155 
3. The Tenuous Future of Curbside Consultations in Minnesota 
                                                           
150 Perley, supra note 142, at 139. 
151 Id. at 139–41. 
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Under Warren 
 The Warren decision has seemingly placed curbside consultations 
on the riskier side of the balance. When paired with the foreseeability of 
harm standard, it is extremely difficult to determine whether professionals 
who engage in one-off discussions could be found negligent in the event a 
patient is harmed. For instance, the majority opinion in Warren argued that 
Dinter, as a hospitalist, should have foreseen that Simon (and, as a result, 
Warren) would rely on his decision not to admit Warren.156 It, therefore, 
followed that Dinter should have foreseen Warren would be harmed if the 
comments he made to Simon were negligently offered.157 Although the court 
noted that it did not intend this decision to apply to curbside consultations, 
it also declined to define such discussions.158 As such, it remains uncertain 
where Minnesota courts will draw the line between what is foreseeable to a 
consulting physician and what is not.  
Courts in other jurisdictions have attempted to address this issue by 
holding that curbside consultations do not expose a consulting physician to 
potential liability.159 For instance, in Irvin v. Smith, the Kansas Supreme 
Court held that a physician providing an “informal opinion” to another 
physician does not create a physician-patient relationship and does not owe 
a duty to the patient.160 The court provided several examples of informal 
opinions, including a “gratuitous” conversation with a treating physician in 
which some patient details were omitted,161 an opinion in which the treating 
                                                           
156 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 380 (Minn. 2019). 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 379. The majority opinion did not create a formal definition of “curbside 
consultations” for health care practitioners engaging in such activities the future. See id. 
However, it provided a few hints. In particular, the court seemed to characterize a curbside 
consultation as an informal discussion in which a professional “pick[s] a colleague’s brain 
about a diagnosis.” Id. Notably, the court did not definitively state whether it would exempt 
a practitioner who engaged in the court’s vision of a curbside consultation from liability in 
future cases. Id. It simply noted that other states had exempted such practitioners. Id. 
159 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l. Hosp., 600 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) 
(“A doctor who gives an informal opinion at the request of a treating physician does not owe 
a duty of care to the patient whose case was discussed.”); Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42, 
49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that “a physician-patient relationship is created only where 
the physician personally examines the patient,” while allowing for hands-off liability where a 
contractual relationship between physician and patient exists); Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 
303, 307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (“To expose physicians . . . to liability for simply conferring 
with a colleague would be detrimental in the long run to those seeking competent medical 
attention and is contrary to the public policy of [Texas].”). 
160 Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001). 
161 Id. (citing Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1, 4 (Ala. 1976)).  
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physician was told to act “as he saw fit,”162 and a discussion in which the 
consulting physician had no role in examining or treating the patient.163  
However, the Irvin court noted that an informal opinion may become 
formal when the consulting physician “assumes the role of treating the 
patient.”164 In other words, when the consulting physician affirmatively acts 
in a way that could be viewed as consenting to participate in the patient’s 
care, the physician forms a physician-patient relationship and owes a 
corresponding duty to the patient.165 Still, the court maintained that a case in 
which the consulting physician did not examine the patient, review the 
patient’s records, speak to the patient, enter any patient orders, or do 
anything other than speak about the patient’s condition in general terms did 
not result in the physician assuming a treatment role and, therefore, the 
physician did not have a duty.166  
4. The Case of the Curbside Hospitalist 
While the majority in Warren did not consider the conversation 
between Dinter and Simon to be a curbside consultation, the facts of the 
case show that the conversation had many of the elements of this type of 
informal discussion. Dinter had not met, examined, or spoken with 
Warren.167 He did not review Warren’s patient records or read her test 
results.168 Dinter’s only role in Warren’s care was hearing from Simon some 
(but not all) of Warren’s symptoms over the course of a ten-minute 
telephone call and offering his opinion that Warren’s symptoms indicated 
uncontrolled diabetes not warranting hospitalization.169  
The majority believed Dinter’s offered opinion and denial of 
admission was enough of an affirmative action to show that Dinter had 
assumed a treatment role, thereby creating a duty to Warren. However, the 
case was not so clear-cut. Dinter did not suggest a specific course of action 
to Simon.170 Instead, he gave his initial opinion and left it to Simon to 
                                                           
162 Id. (citing Hill v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)). 
163 Id. (citing Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 306). 
164 Id. (citing Tumblin v. Ball-Incon Glass Packaging Corp., 478 S.E.2d 81, 85 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1996); Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem’l. Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 39–40 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1993)). 
165 Id. at 941–42. 
166 Id. at 942–43. 
167 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 381 (Minn. 2019) (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 382. 
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determine what additional steps to take.171 Notably, Simon’s subsequent 
action—calling Baldwin, her collaborating physician—shows that Simon did 
not initially take Dinter’s opinion as an instruction.172 Rather, Simon’s 
request that Baldwin help her have Warren admitted shows Simon 
understood there were other ways to get Warren the care she believed 
Warren required.173 Baldwin later confirmed that there were other potential 
treatment options available to Simon, including requesting that Warren visit 
an emergency room.174 Yet, Simon—the health care practitioner who was 
responsible for Warren’s care—opted not to pursue any of these options 
and released Warren despite her apparent feeling that more should be 
done.175  
The court held that Dinter should have foreseen Simon, having 
received advice from two physicians, would, as Justice Anderson phrased it, 
“fail to make reasonable treatment decisions regarding her patient.”176 
Under the majority’s view, health care practitioners must weigh the benefit 
of engaging their colleagues in curbside consultations against the risk that 
they may be liable for any decisions made as a result of—or in spite of—these 
conversations.177 This holding could have a chilling effect on the valuable 
interactions physicians and other health care practitioners share with their 
colleagues, which would, in turn, limit collaboration and teamwork in 
medical settings.178 Just as alarmingly, it could prove to be detrimental to 
patient care by closing off an important source of clinical knowledge—other 
health care practitioners. 
B. The Foreseeability of Harm Standard Favored by Minnesota Courts 
Should Be Narrowly Construed to Avoid Unintended Consequences 
Several issues may arise when Minnesota’s foreseeability of harm 
standard is read too broadly. Viewing the potential unintended 
                                                           
171 Id. at 383 (“Dinter’s hospitalization decision was neither determinative nor the final 
answer.”). 
172 Id. at 373. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 383 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 382. 
177 See id. at 375–80 (majority opinion). 
178 Id. at 378 (“[Respondents], amici, and the dissent all warn that making physicians liable 
for curbside consultations would harm patients by chilling beneficial interaction among 
professionals. Indeed, many states exempt third-party doctors from malpractice liability 
when their colleagues engage them in curbside consultations to ‘informally solicit one 
another’s opinions’ regarding their patients.” (quoting Victor R. Cotton, Legal Risks of 
“Curbside” Consults, 106 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 135, 135, 136 (2010))). 
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consequences of an overbroad reading of this standard through the lens of 
current federal laws, including the Affordable Care Act and the Medicare 
Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act, the resolution of these issues may 
not be as simple as requiring a physician-patient relationship for a medical 
malpractice action. 
1. Foreseeability of Harm: Finding the Balance Between Overbroad 
and Just Right 
 The Warren court declined to join the majority of states that require 
some kind of physician-patient relationship as part of a medical malpractice 
claim.179 However, as noted in Justice Anderson’s dissent, the use of the 
foreseeability of harm standard in medical malpractice cases is not generally 
problematic.180 The results are only troublesome when the concept of 
foreseeability is applied too broadly.181  
For instance, the cases cited by the majority in Warren, including 
Skillings, Togstad, and Molloy II,182 all involved conversations between a 
professional and a layperson (e.g., a patient’s parents or a potential legal 
client).183 Conversely, Warren involved a conversation between two health 
care professionals.184 According to Justice Anderson, it was foreseeable that 
the laypeople in Skillings, Togstad, and Molloy II would rely upon any 
advice they drew from their personal conversations with a professional—
whether a relationship existed or not.185 However, it was not foreseeable that 
a third party who was uninvolved in a conversation between two 
professionals would similarly rely on (or even be aware of) any information 
gleaned from such a discussion.186 
 Justice Anderson’s dissent also noted that Simon’s actions were not 
foreseeable to Dinter under Foss v. Kincade, where the court acknowledged 
                                                           
179 Id. at 377. 
180 Id. at 386 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 376–77 (citing Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Minn. 2004) (conversation between 
a physician and the patient’s parent); Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 1980) 
(conversation between an attorney and a potential client); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 
324, 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919) (conversation between a physician and the patient’s 
parents)). 
183 Id. at 386 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
184 Id.  
185 Id.  
186 Id. at 387. In a typical conversation between professionals, Justice Anderson notes, the 
subject of the discussion is often unaware of the conversation. This is true even if the 
professional seeking the advice wraps information from his or her colleague into a final 
decision about the subject of the discussion. 
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cases in which “the realm of possible harm is much larger than the realm of 
reasonably foreseeable harm.”187 Accordingly, “[w]hen determining whether 
a danger is foreseeable, we ‘look at whether the specific danger was 
objectively reasonable to expect, not simply whether it was within the realm 
of any conceivable possibility.’”188 Harms which are not “objectively 
reasonable to expect” are “too remote to create liability.”189  
For instance, in the case of Foss, the court held that while the 
defendants knew it was possible that their bookcase could be tipped over if 
it were not secured to the wall, it was unreasonable to expect them to “make 
a laundry list of common household items with which a three-year-old could 
conceivably injure himself” before inviting the child and his family into their 
home.190 This is because the law does not require homeowners to “take 
every precaution to guard against every possible eventuality.”191 It is only 
necessary that homeowners guard against actions that are objectively 
reasonable to foresee.192 
 Interestingly, the majority opinion in Warren also quotes this 
passage.193 In doing so, the majority seemingly argues that the specific 
danger—that Simon would rely on Dinter’s opinions, casting off her own 
judgment and forgoing further testing or efforts to hospitalize Warren even 
when she believed something was very wrong with her—was “objectively 
reasonable” for Dinter to expect.194 The majority bases this argument on 
Dinter’s role as a hospitalist responsible for determining whether a patient 
should be admitted to the facility.195 However, while Dinter’s decision not to 
admit Warren may have foreclosed one avenue of continued treatment, it 
did not require Simon to abandon all options.196 Simon remained Warren’s 
primary provider of care, and she had the authority to pursue alternative 
means of care for her patient.197 It seems unlikely that Dinter could have 
foreseen his opinion—his initial “no” to hospitalization—would have 
                                                           
187 Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. 2009). 
188 Id. at 322 (quoting Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 
N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998)). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 323. 
191 Id.  
192 Id.  
193 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 378 (Minn. 2019). 
194 Id.  
195 Id.  
196 Id. at 382 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
197 Id. at 383. 
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prevented Simon from trusting her clinical knowledge and ordering 
additional testing or treatment.198 
 That said, Warren appears to be a case in which “reasonable persons 
might differ as to the foreseeability of [an] injury.”199 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has typically held that these “close cases” are an issue for 
the jury.200 Therefore, while both the majority and the dissenting opinion 
claim to have the correct view of foreseeability under Foss, the ultimate 
decision regarding whether Simon’s action (or inaction) should have been 
foreseeable to Dinter is left to the jury.201 This would likely be true even if 
there is no “explicit factual dispute in the record.”202 
 Still, Justice Anderson’s reading of this standard appears to provide 
more guidance on the issue of foreseeability of harm during a curbside 
consultation than does the majority’s interpretation. When two 
professionals have an informal conversation about patient care, there could 
be many reasonably foreseeable outcomes. The conversation could lead to 
the treating professional (in this case, Simon) asking additional questions, 
ordering more tests, seeking out a formal consultation between the 
consulting physician and the patient, or requesting a referral to another 
provider with more experience in a certain area of medicine. However, it is 
unreasonable to require the consulting professional to expect that his 
opinion would cause the treating professional to suspend all other methods 
of caring for her patient, as was the case in Warren.203 
                                                           
198 Id.  
199 See Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2017). 
200 Mike Steenson, Duty, Foreseeability, and Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc., 39 
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. J. PUB. POL’Y. & PRAC. 31, 44 (2018). 
201 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn. 
2011)) (citing Fenrich v. Blake School, 920 N.W.2d 195, 205 (Minn. 2018); Senogles v. 
Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, 48 (Minn. 2017); Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629; Foss v. 
Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322–23 (Minn. 2009); Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha 
Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998)). 
202 Steenson, supra note 200, at 46 (quoting Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629). Arguably, 
there is a factual dispute in Warren because Simon and Dinter disagreed about the extent to 
which they discussed Warren’s condition during their telephone call. Warren, 926 N.W.2d 
at 373. Yet, even if there were no factual dispute, reasonable minds could differ regarding 
whether Dinter should have foreseen Simon’s subsequent actions. See Steenson, supra note 
200, at 46. 
203 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 383 (Anderson, J., dissenting). The court did not consider 
whether Simon’s decision to send Warren home, despite the existence and availability of 
other treatment options, constituted an intervening or superseding cause of Warren’s death. 
It is likely that the majority in Warren believed Simon’s actions should have been foreseeable 
to Dinter, and, therefore, even if this was an intervening cause, the court would have found 
that it could not be a superseding cause. See Steenson, supra note 200, at 38. Minnesota’s 
jury instruction echoes this idea by requiring a superseding cause to meet four requirements: 
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2. Potential Unintended Consequences of an Overbroad 
Foreseeability of Harm Standard 
 It is important that courts do not create unintended consequences 
for health care professionals who engage in clinical discussions with their 
colleagues by using an overbroad interpretation of foreseeability of harm. 
Health care practices, systems, facilities, and payors are increasingly 
encouraging—and even incentivizing—collaboration among health care 
professionals.204 These policies tend to have two goals: limiting health care 
costs and improving quality of care. 
a. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
The Affordable Care Act, signed into law in 2010, created a Medicare 
Shared Savings Program, which incentivized the use of Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs)205 and Patient-Centered Medical Homes (PCMHs).206 
                                                           
(1) it occurred after the original act of negligence; (2) it did not occur due to the original 
negligent act; (3) it altered the “natural course of events by making the result different from 
what it would have been;” and (4) the original negligent party could not have reasonably 
anticipated the action. 4 MINN. PRAC., JURY INSTR. GUIDES—CIVIL CIVJIG 27.20 (6th ed. 
2014). Even if the court believed that Simon’s action was an intervening or superseding cause, 
the result may be the same for Dinter, as the court has held that superseding causes are 
“adequately taken into consideration in the comparative-fault formula.” Montemayor, 898 
N.W.2d at 631 (quoting Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 625 (1984)). 
204 Jessica Mantel, The Myth of the Independent Physician: Implications for Health Law, 
Policy, and Ethics, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 455, 467 (2013). 
205 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2018)); see also Mark T. Morrell & Alex T. Krouse, 
Accountability Partners: Legislated Collaboration for Health Reform, 11 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 225, 244 (2014). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) defines 
ACOs as:  
[G]roups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers, who come together 
voluntarily to give coordinated high-quality care to their Medicare patients. The goal of 
coordinated care is to ensure that patients get the right care at the right time, while avoiding 
unnecessary duplication of services and avoiding medical errors. When an ACO succeeds 
both in delivering high-quality care and spending health care dollars more wisely, the ACO 
will share in the savings it achieves for the Medicare program. 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 
2, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/ 
[https://perma.cc/MER5-G9N9].  
206 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3502(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 256a-1 (2018)); see also Mantel, supra note 204, at 247–48. The U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ), defines PCMHs as a model of primary care delivery which includes five key 
features: (1) comprehensive patient care, including preventive, acute, and chronic care, 
delivered by a team of practitioners that include physicians, nurse practitioners, physician 
30
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss3/6
2020] CASE NOTE: WARREN V. DINTER 719 
 
  
ACOs are health care entities that consist of teams of providers who are 
accountable to both patients and each other in streamlining and 
coordinating patient care.207 ACOs are performance-driven, and they receive 
shared financial incentives when they improve patient outcomes (e.g., by 
limiting hospital admissions) while meeting cost and quality measures.208 
Similarly, PCMHs use health care provider teams to offer primary care 
services that are “accessible, continuous, comprehensive, family-centered, 
coordinated, compassionate, and culturally effective.”209  
The success or failure of these models largely depends on providers’ 
ability to communicate with one another about patient care. Effective use of 
ACOs and PCMHs—both of which are intended to improve patient care 
outcomes and help reduce health care spending210—would be nearly 
impossible to implement and manage if health care providers feared they 
could be held liable for even the most cursory conversation about the care 
of a participating patient. 
                                                           
assistants, and other health care professionals; (2) patient-centered focus, which includes the 
patient’s individual health as well as his or her “unique needs, culture, values, and 
preferences;” (3) coordination of care, through which the “medical home” serves as the 
patient’s primary provider which brings in additional specialists when necessary; (4) 
accessibility of care, including reduced wait times, increased service hours, immediate 
appointments for urgent issues, and 24-hour services via telecommunications; and (5) 
improved quality and safety, with an emphasis on shared decision-making between health 
care providers, patients, and families and improved data collection and measurement. 
Defining the PCMH, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://pcmh.ahrq.gov/page/defining-pcmh 
[https://perma.cc/RZ9B-BU36] (last visited Sept. 23, 2019). 
207 Morrell & Krouse, supra note 205, at 244. 
208 Id.  
209 Id. at 247 (quoting Melinda K. Abrams et al., Can Patient-Centered Medical Homes 
Transform Health Care Delivery?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 27, 2009), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/other-publication/2009/mar/can-patient-
centered-medical-homes-transform-health-care [https://perma.cc/E8F6-F7KA]). 
210 Id. at 244, 248. The Affordable Care Act included many other provisions that are meant 
to incentivize collaboration among health care providers, including increased funding for 
community health centers, which focus on outreach to underserved communities. Id. at 256, 
288. The authors also note that the Affordable Care Act’s goal of insuring more individuals 
means that demand for health care services will increase. See id. at 287. This will require an 
all-hands-on-deck approach where physicians and non-physician providers like nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants work together to assure those who need care are able 
to receive it. See id. 
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b. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act 
 In 2015, Congress passed legislation that created new, “value-based” 
payment models for the federal Medicare program.211 These models are 
meant to improve quality, outcomes, and cost-effectiveness rather than 
simply paying providers on a per-visit, per-procedure basis.212 A key 
component of value-based payment for health care services is the 
streamlining of patient care, particularly for patients with multiple or 
complex health conditions.213 The average Medicare beneficiary visits two 
primary care providers and five specialty care providers each year, plus 
additional health professionals who offer diagnostic services—such as 
imaging and bloodwork—and pharmacy services.214 However, Medicare 
beneficiaries with chronic or complex conditions may require exponentially 
more visits and increasingly specialized providers.215 These patients, in 
particular, can benefit from modernized payment models which allow teams 
of providers to work together to treat the patient in an efficient manner.216  
 Research supports the implementation of policies that increase the 
use of value-based, team-provided health care for Medicare beneficiaries.217 
Moreover, health care practices using these care models have shown 
increased clinician productivity.218 However, Warren raises questions about 
how far “foreseeability” will travel in a practice that emphasizes team-based 
care. Would a conversation between a primary care provider and a specialty 
provider about a patient create a duty in the consulting physician? If the 
provider who asked the question subsequently opted not to continue care, 
would the provider who answered it be responsible? The implications of 
the Warren decision could be far-reaching. 
3. Formal Physician-Patient Relationships: A Solution? Not So Fast 
                                                           
211 Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 101(c) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2018)). 
212 See Quality Payment Program Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://qpp.cms.gov/about/qpp-overview [https://perma.cc/52UH-BAJ2] (last visited Sept. 
23, 2019); MIPS Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://qpp.cms.gov/mips/overview [https://perma.cc/3M8C-MVPH] (last visited Sept. 23, 
2019). 
213 Cynthia D. Smith et al., Implementing Optimal Team-Based Care to Reduce Clinician 
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. . . 
 Many states have intentionally or unintentionally foreclosed the issue 
of an overbroad application of foreseeability in medical malpractice cases 
by requiring the existence of a physician-patient relationship,219 direct patient 
contact,220 or other expressions of consent by the consulting physician to be 
clinically responsible for the patient’s care221 before a duty is created. 
However, as a handful of courts have noted, the changing nature of health 
care—particularly, the emphasis on team-based care—has further 
complicated determinations about the existence of a true physician-patient 
relationship.222  
While federal interest in reducing health care spending bears 
significant responsibility for this shift, other factors in the health care 
marketplace have contributed as well. Although small, physician-owned 
practices once dominated the U.S. health care system, reforms meant to 
increase efficiency and lower health care costs have led to an increase in 
large-group- or hospital-owned health care conglomerates.223 Gone are the 
days of physicians opening their own solo practices.224 In fact, the percentage 
of physicians who are in private practice has decreased from over 72% in 
1988 to just under 46% in 2018.225  
As a result, today’s physicians have been thrust into practice settings 
where they are surrounded by a large number of colleagues, and they are 
expected to deliver health care services seamlessly, as a team.226 In these 
environments, it may be difficult to ascertain who has a physician-patient 
relationship with a patient and who does not. 
Arguably, in these settings, Minnesota’s “foreseeability of harm” 
standard may be more effective in establishing whether a health care 
                                                           
219 See, e.g., Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001). 
220 See generally Blake, supra note 42, at 589–93 (discussing cases where a duty was imposed 
from direct patient contact as an alternative to the traditional physician-patient requirement).  
221 Baird, supra note 40, at 191. 
222 See, e.g., Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 910 (Or. 2012); Kelley v. Middle 
Tenn. Emergency Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 596 (Tenn. 2004). 
223 Mantel, supra note 204, at 461–63. 
224 Stephen L. Isaacs et al., The Independent Physician — Going, Going . . ., 360 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 655, 655–57 (2009). 
225 Tanya Henry, Employed Physicians Now Exceed Those Who Own Their Own Practices, 
AM. MED. ASS’N (May 10, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/about/research/employed-
physicians-now-exceed-those-who-own-their-practices [https://perma.cc/A35T-MFH6]. The 
number of employed physicians was higher than the number of physicians in private practice 
for the first time in 2018. Id. However, the total percentage of physicians practicing in fully 
physician-owned settings was 54%. Id. 
226 Mantel, supra note 204, at 463. 
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provider has a duty to a patient than the more common physician-patient 
relationship standard. However, to prevent unintended consequences, 
foreseeability must be narrowly construed. Justice Anderson’s approach in 
Warren seems to strike the proper balance by focusing on the foreseeability 
of the “specific danger,” as illustrated in Foss.227 This standard would benefit 
both patients228 and health care professionals while continuing to encourage 
a professional exchange of ideas through collaboration. 
C. Warren Illustrates the Legal and Policy Implications of the Evolving 
Role of Advanced Practice Providers 
Warren illustrates legal and policy questions surrounding the increased 
practice authority of advanced practice providers. This section considers 
physicians’ legal responsibility from collaborating with or supervising nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants. Additionally, it discusses the 
responsibility of physicians who practice alongside advanced practice 
providers with whom they do not have a legal collaborative or supervisory 
relationship.  
1. The Argument for Limiting Physician Responsibility for Advanced 
Practice Providers 
The Warren decision illustrates what is likely to become a more 
common question as advanced practice providers continue to grow in 
number and authority: to what degree, if any, should physicians be held 
responsible for care provided by a nurse practitioner or physician assistant? 
In Warren, the court ultimately held that Dinter, who had neither seen 
Simon’s patient nor reviewed the patient’s records, could nonetheless be 
liable for the patient’s death.229 This was true even though Simon could have 
taken other actions concerning Warren’s condition to assure Warren 
                                                           
227 Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009) (quoting Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford 
v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn.1998)). 
228 Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 5. (“Patients ultimately benefit from . . . 
informal discussions and brainstorming sessions among providers by receiving improved 
care.”) The brief goes on to state: 
Discouraging these informal discussions by assigning liability to providers who offer input 
and suggestions on an informal basis would only serve to harm patients. The better position 
is one recognized and adopted by the Court of Appeals, where a physician providing an 
informal consultation to an independent treating provider does not assume a physician-
patient relationship with that patient. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the majority of 
other states who have considered this policy issue, and would stifle and discourage the robust 
practice of medicine in Minnesota to the detriment of patient care. 
Id. at 8. 
229 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 380 (Minn. 2019). 
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received appropriate care despite Dinter’s refusal to admit her.230 For 
instance, Simon could have ordered further testing or directed Warren to 
seek emergency room care, but she declined to do so.231 This result has 
correctly caused physicians to fear the extent to which they can be held 
responsible for care provided by another practitioner.232 
As nurse practitioners and physician assistants gain more autonomy, 
their relationship with physicians will continue to change. This is particularly 
true in the case of nurse practitioners, who have completely severed their 
legal ties to physicians in states like Minnesota that have enacted full practice 
authority legislation.233 While Warren came at a time of change for the 
advanced practice nursing profession, nurse practitioners in Minnesota are 
now considered to be autonomous.234 As noted in the Minnesota Hospital 
Association’s amici curiae brief supporting Dinter, holding a physician 
responsible for the autonomous act of a nurse practitioner after the 
enactment of full practice authority legislation violates the spirit of this 
change.235 
That said, there is a compelling argument for limiting physicians’ 
responsibility for care provided by advanced practice providers, like 
physician assistants, who do not currently have full practice authority in 
Minnesota.236 Simon’s collaborative relationship with Baldwin at the time of 
the events leading to Warren’s death was similar to that of a physician 
assistant and supervising physician today, in which physician assistants have 
a legal tie to their supervising physician.237 This is accomplished by stating 
that the physician is “responsible” for the health care services rendered by 
the provider.238  
However, this provision does not mean that the supervising or 
collaborating physician is solely responsible for the care provided by the 
advanced practice provider.239 Rather, physician assistants who practice 
under a supervisory agreement with a physician remain liable for their own 
                                                           
230 Id. at 382–83 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
231 Id. at 382. 
232 Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 2–3. 
233 Id. at 10–12. 
234 Id. at 12. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 See MINN. STAT. § 147A.01, subdiv. 24 (2019) (providing that, in Minnesota, a supervising 
physician “oversee[s] the activities of, and accept[s] responsibility for, the medical services 
rendered by a physician assistant”). 
238 Id. 
239 Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 13. 
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actions and omissions.240 Holding physicians responsible for the 
autonomous decisions of advanced practice providers is counterproductive 
and may expose physicians to unnecessary liability.241 
2. The Potential Effects of Warren on Physicians and Advanced 
Practice Providers Who Are Not in a Legal Collaborative 
Relationship 
In Warren, the court held that Dinter, a physician with no legal tie to 
Simon, was nonetheless legally responsible for Simon’s patient.242 The court 
used Dinter’s role as a hospitalist to cast him as a “gatekeeper” who should 
have foreseen that his refusal to admit Warren, if negligent, would cause her 
harm.243 This holding could cause physicians who provide any kind of 
guidance, advice, or one-off instruction to be held liable for independent 
decisions made by an advanced practice provider.244 This potential result 
would be devastating to the delivery of health care, both in Minnesota and 
in states that find Warren to be persuasive. Advanced practice providers 
who are supervised by, or collaborate with, physicians typically enter into a 
written practice agreement that affirms the relationship, defines the roles 
and duties of each party, and sets forth the terms and expectations related 
to supervision or collaboration.245 Physicians and advanced practice 
providers willingly enter into these agreements, with each party 
understanding its roles and responsibilities therein.246  
However, if physicians who have not chosen to enter a specific 
supervisory or collaborative agreement with an advanced practice provider 
run the risk of being liable for the care provided by those providers, these 
physicians may begin refusing, even incidentally, to work alongside them.247 
This, in turn, would lead physicians to refer advanced practice providers 
                                                           
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 8, 13. 
242 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 379–80 (Minn. 2019).  
243 Id. at 380. 
244 Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 13. 
245 See MINN. STAT. § 147A.01, subdiv. 17a (2019) (requiring physician assistants to enter 
into a “delegation agreement” with a supervising physician). The delegation or practice 
agreement must set forth the physician assistant’s scope of practice, including the physician 
assistant’s role in patient care and the categories of medications and medical devices that the 
physician may prescribe. Id. The agreement must also describe the method of supervision. 
Id. Supervision does not require the physician’s constant physical presence, but the physician 
assistant and supervising physician must be able to be easily contacted via 
telecommunication. Id. subdiv. 24. 
246 Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 13. 
247 Id. at 14. 
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back to their supervising or collaborating physicians rather than engaging in 
collaborative discussion.248 In cases where time is of the essence, a delay 
caused by fear of liability could mean the difference between life and death.  
D. How Can Health Care Practitioners Protect Themselves from Liability 
Post-Warren? 
 The Warren decision raises concerns among many in the health care 
community—in Minnesota and elsewhere.249 In the wake of this holding, 
physicians and other health care practitioners should be mindful of the 
potential liability they could incur by collaborating too closely on patient 
care. What follows are some courses of action that health care providers 
(and other professionals) can take to limit their risk post-Warren, 
categorized based on the role of the consulting practitioner.  
1. For Gatekeepers 
 Practitioners who are in a “gatekeeper” role, similar to Dinter’s role 
as a hospitalist, are most likely to be at risk due to the Warren decision.250 
Justice Anderson’s dissent suggests that hospitalists who fear liability of the 
kind assigned to Dinter must “refuse to take calls from other professionals 
to discuss potential hospitalization of those professionals’ patients.”251 
                                                           
248 Id. 
249 See, e.g., Christopher Johnson, How a Minnesota Supreme Court Decision Could Affect 
Curbside Consults, KEVINMD.COM (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2019/05/how-a-minnesota-supreme-court-decision-could-
affect-curbside-consults.html [https://perma.cc/YSJ9-4AAP] (arguing that the court’s use of 
foreseeability of harm is “chilling” because a consulting physician may not have been 
provided all of the relevant patient details, particularly if the patient’s condition relates to a 
different field of medicine); MN Supreme Court Rules Physician-Patient Relationship Is Not 
Necessary to Sue Docs for Malpractice, MINN. MED. ASS’N (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://www.mnmed.org/news-and-publications/News/MN-Supreme-Court-Rules-Physician-
Patient-Relations [https://perma.cc/K98K-FM62] (stressing that the decision may hinder 
physicians’ ability to collaborate with colleagues and quoting the General Counsel of the 
association-endorsed medical liability insurer, COPIC, in stating that the “expansive 
language” in the decision “raise[s] concerns”); MN Supreme Court: Warren v. Dinter, MINN. 
MED. GRP. MGMT. ASS’N (June 26, 2019), https://www.mmgma.org/news/458203/MN-
Supreme-Court-Warren-v.-Dinter.htm [https://perma.cc/T3UH-2ZWD] (reporting that the 
decision raises concerns for physicians and that the Minnesota Medical Association and the 
Minnesota Hospital Association have created task forces to study the issue). 
250 See Ryan C. Ellis, Warren v. Dinter Case, GISLASON & HUNTER LLP: INSIGHTS (Apr. 24, 
2019), https://www.gislason.com/warren-v-dinter-case/ [https://perma.cc/EMS3-4D58]. 
251 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 386 (Minn. 2019) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Warren v. Dinter, No. A17-0555, 2018 WL 414333, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018)). 
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However, such an overcorrection would certainly harm patients.252 Instead, 
these practitioners should operate under the assumption that if they provide 
any kind of advice, guidance, or commentary about a patient to a colleague, 
that colleague will rely upon the advice.253 Hospitalists must also assume they 
have a duty to their colleagues’ patients because it is foreseeable that if their 
advice is negligently given, a patient could be harmed.254 
2. For Other Collaborators 
 Other, non-gatekeeper practitioners should also exercise caution.255 
When a colleague asks for an opinion about treating a patient who is 
unknown to the consulting practitioner, the consulting practitioner should 
make sure to understand as many details of the patient’s condition and 
history as possible, especially if the consulting practitioner believes the 
advice will strongly weigh on the colleague’s course of action.256  
However, increasing the consulting practitioner’s knowledge about the 
patient (e.g., by sharing test results or patient records) could constitute the 
tipping point between a curbside consultation and a consultation viewed as 
more formal by the court.257 Consulting practitioners should, therefore, have 
                                                           
252 See id. (stating that the decision in Warren “is unlikely to serve Minnesotans well, 
particularly those who may have access to primary health care but lack access to a deep 
network of medical specialists”). 
253 Ellis, supra note 250. 
254 Id. 
255 Some commentators have written that the holding in Warren is unlikely to affect true 
curbside consultations. See id. Instead, it is argued that this decision will have the greatest 
effect on cases that involve a practitioner in a gatekeeper role. Id. (stating that a “gatekeeper” 
practitioner should assume, in the aftermath of Warren, that their “advice and guidance will 
be relied upon.”) However, it has also been noted that the lack of guidance by the court 
regarding the definition of “curbside consultation” has resulted in uncertainty about where 
the line will be drawn between foreseeable and not foreseeable. Id. 
256 See id. (“If, however, a healthcare provider is asked to opine regarding a course of 
treatment for a patient that is unknown to them, they ought to exercise caution about the 
advice they provide to their colleagues and make sure they understand the nature and extent 
of the medical issue because the advice and guidance they provide may ultimately be 
determinative.”). 
257 Thaddeus Pope, Curbside Consults: New Liability Risks to Avoid When You Are Not a 
Patient’s Physician, ASCO POST (June 25, 2019), https://www.ascopost.com/issues/june-25-
2019/new-liability-risks-to-avoid-when-you-are-not-a-patient-s-physician/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZMA5-36XN]. An informal, curbside consultation usually has several key 
features: (1) it involves brief, non-specific information, without much detail; (2) it does not 
involve direct patient interaction (in person or otherwise); (3) it does not involve the 
consulting physician’s review of the patient’s record or participation in formulating the 
patient’s care plan; (4) it results in the offering of mostly academic advice; and (5) it is not 
38
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss3/6
2020] CASE NOTE: WARREN V. DINTER 727 
 
  
a “low threshold” for recommending a formal patient consultation, whether 
with themselves or another professional.258 When in doubt, practitioners 
should step back from an informal discussion and recommend a more 
formal consult.259 
3. For All Consulting Practitioners 
 Some recommendations stemming from the Warren decision apply 
to health care practitioners in any situation. First and foremost, practitioners 
should understand the laws of the jurisdiction in which they practice.260 If 
there is still a lack of clarity (and post-Warren, this will likely be the case), 
practitioners should look to the policies set by their employers (e.g., 
hospitals or medical groups) or their liability insurance carriers.261 
Practitioners should also use Warren as a reminder that, in Minnesota, a 
duty may exist to a patient even if a traditional physician-patient relationship 
has not been created. This means that any type of communication about a 
patient, whether in person, via email, in a phone call, or through any other 
means, could create such a duty, depending on the situation.262  
 Additionally, practitioners should keep detailed records of any 
consultations they provide to their colleagues—curbside or otherwise.263 
Warren involved conflicting accounts of what information Simon had 
provided to Dinter and exactly what Dinter had recommended (or not 
recommended).264 Record-keeping on both sides could help resolve any 
questions regarding the nature and extent of a conversation between 
professionals.  
 Finally, practitioners should consult with their professional 
associations for assistance in navigating the Warren decision. For example, 
the Minnesota Medical Association has released initial suggestions for 
Minnesota physicians, focusing on how to avoid liability due to curbside 
                                                           
billed by the consulting practitioner. Id. However, if even one of these attributes is missing, 
the interaction runs the risk of becoming a formal consultation. Id. 
258 Ellis, supra note 250. 
259 Pope, supra note 257. 
260 Brianne Goodwin, Not Your Patient? You Can Still Be Sued for Malpractice, UROLOGY 
TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.urologytimes.com/malpractice-consult/not-your-patient-
you-can-still-be-sued-malpractice/page/0/1 [https://perma.cc/29SD-YKE4]. 
261 See id. 
262 Ellis, supra note 250. 
263 See id.  
264 Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Minn. 2019).  
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consultations.265 While these forms of guidance do not constitute legal 
advice, they can be useful in establishing best practices. 
4. For Professionals Outside Health Care 
 In his dissent, Justice Anderson cautioned that the Warren decision 
could have effects that reach into professions beyond health care.266 
Curbside consultations are not unique to medicine; in fact, they are 
frequently used by lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to get an 
informal second opinion on a matter involving a client.267 As was the case in 
Warren, the clients of these consulting professionals are generally unaware 
of these professional-to-professional conversations.268 Yet, under this 
decision, it is possible that these professionals could also unwittingly create 
a duty to a client when a colleague consults them.269  
As a result, professionals outside health care should also use caution 
when engaging in informal, curbside discussions.270 In particular, the 
Minnesota Medical Association’s advice—to clearly state when a 
conversation is informal, keep informal conversations brief and limited in 
scope, and recommend formal consultations when appropriate271—likely 
translates well to other professionals who find themselves in situations 
similar to Dinter’s. Additionally, other professionals would be well-served 
to keep detailed notes of any informal consultations in which they choose 
to participate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Warren considered whether a conversation between a treating nurse 
practitioner and a consulting physician was enough to create a duty to the 
                                                           
265 MINN. MED. ASS’N, MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT UPDATE: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
ALERT (2019), https://www.mnmed.org/MMA/media/Hidden-
Documents/MedicalMalpracticeAlert.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VP7-EFV9]. The Minnesota 
Medical Association’s guidance to physicians includes: (1) only providing advice if there is 
enough information to support a conclusion; (2) expecting non-physician providers to be 
more reliant on advice than other physicians; (3) keeping curbside consultations brief and 
general; (4) recommending formal consultations when appropriate; (5) seeking changes to 
internal facility or practice policies regarding the line between formal and informal 
consultations; (6) avoiding “defensive medicine” that can compromise patient care and lead 
to more, rather than less, liability; and (7) being clear during consultations about whether the 
discussion is formal or informal. Id. 
266 Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 386 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
267 Id. at 386–87.  
268 Id. at 387. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 MINN. MED. ASS’N, supra note 265. 
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patient in the physician. The court applied an established foreseeability of 
harm standard and concluded that the consulting physician should have 
foreseen that the nurse practitioner’s patient would rely on the content of 
this conversation and be harmed if the physician negligently provided any 
advice. The court declined to address the legal status of one-time curbside 
consultations between health care professionals.  
The decision in Warren could have the unintended consequence of 
impeding collaboration between colleagues in health care settings and, 
ultimately, negatively impact patient care. The decision has also created 
uncertainty among health care providers and professionals outside of health 
care alike. Therefore, professionals should take precautionary measures to 
appropriately reduce liability and consult with their employing entities and 
professional associations for further guidance. 
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